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THE QUESTIONABLE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION CLAUSES FOR PHARMACISTS
Nancy K. Kubasek, Daniel C. Tagliarina & Corinne Staggs*
INTRODUCTION
What used to be a simple request is turning into a political
firestorm. Increasingly, women seeking to fill prescriptions for
birth control pills and emergency contraception are being turned
away from pharmacy counters across the country as a result of
“conscientious objection laws,” also referred to as “conscience
clauses” or “refusal clauses.” Such clauses allow pro-life
pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions that are against the
pharmacist’s individual religious or moral beliefs.1 While these
clauses may appear to be benign clauses that simply give
pharmacists the right to practice their profession in accordance
with their conscience, conscientious objector clauses violate the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution and
present a dangerous interference with the fundamental right to
privacy established by Griswold v. Connecticut2 and its progeny. 3

* Nancy K. Kubasek is a Professor of Legal Studies at Bowling Green State
University. Daniel C. Tagliarina is a Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science at the
University of Connecticut. Corinne Staggs is a Research Assistant for Professor
Kubasek.
1
The first reported refusal of a pharmacist to fill a prescription for an
emergency contraceptive was in 1991. Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of
Conscientious Objection—May Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for
Emergency Contraception?, 351 N EW ENG. J. M ED . 2008, 2008 (2004).
2
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (extending the right to protect

225

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

226

2/11/08 9:39 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

It is perhaps this interference with a woman’s right to privacy,
which protects her right to use emergency contraception, to
practice birth control, and to make important family planning
decisions with the advice of her physician, that has stimulated the
growing outcry against these laws. The strongest legal argument
against these laws is that they violate the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution. This article contends that
conscientious objection statutes must be struck down as
unconstitutional because such laws violate the Establishment
Clause, or alternatively, that the statute must be narrowly drawn to
provide only extremely limited circumstances under which the right
to object can be exercised.
Part I of this article examines conscientious objection laws
often used by pharmacists who refuse to fill birth control and
emergency contraception prescriptions. Part II delineates a
historical backdrop to this issue and provides a background for
understanding how the courts may examine this issue in the future.
Part III examines why conscientious objection laws violate the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Part IV discusses the
balance of interests between the woman’s right to privacy and the
pharmacist’s interest in fulfilling his obligations without violating
his conscience. Finally, the article concludes that the state may
support a pharmacist’s right to refuse to fill lawfully prescribed
prescriptions for birth control and emergency contraception only
under the most limited of circumstances, and therefore most
conscientious objection laws are unconstitutional.
I.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION LAWS

Many state legislatures have addressed the issue of
conscientious objection in medical procedures relating to
private sexual relations between consenting adults); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1998) (reaffirming the right); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affirming the right and extending it to minors); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (extending the right to protect a woman’s right
to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester, and under certain
circumstances during the second and third trimesters); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1967) (extending the right to non-married couples).
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reproductive choice.4 Historically, these conscientious objection
laws have applied to abortion procedures5 and occasionally
4

ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ . REV . STAT . A NN. § 36-2151
(2006); ARK. CODE . A NN . § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123420 (West 2006); COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO . REV .
STAT . § 25-6-102 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); FLA . STAT .
§ 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); HAW . REV . STAT . §
453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4
(2005); IND. CODE A NN. § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005);
KAN . STAT . A NN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV . STAT . A NN. § 311.800 (West
2006); LA. REV . STAT . § 40:1299.31 (2006); ME . REV . STAT. A NN. tit. 22, §
1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN ., H EALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS.
ANN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.20181 (2006); MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41107-5 (2006); MO . R EV . S TAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT . CODE ANN . § 50-20111 (2005); NEB. REV . STAT . A NN. § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV . STAT . A NN.
§ 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT . A NN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT .
ANN . § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV . RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT . § 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT . CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO
REV . CODE A NN. § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741
(2005); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.225 (2006);
18 PA . CONS. STAT . § 3213 (2005); R.I. G EN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C.
CODE ANN . § 44-41-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006);
T ENN . CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); TEX . OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002
(Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN . § 18.275 (2006); W ASH. REV . CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (2006); W. V A. CODE § 162B-4 (2006); W IS. STAT . § 253.09 (2006); W YO . STAT. ANN . § 42-5-101
(2006).
5
ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ . REV . STAT . A NN. § 36-2151
(2006); ARK. CODE . A NN . § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123420 (West 2006); DEL . CODE ANN . tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); HAW . REV .
STAT . § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE A NN. § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT . 70/4 (2005); I ND. C ODE § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA C ODE § 146.1 (2005);
KAN . STAT . A NN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV . STAT . A NN. § 311.800 (West
2006); LA . REV . STAT . A NN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); MD . CODE ANN .,
HEALTH-GEN . § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis
Nexis 2006); MICH . COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN . STAT . §
145.414 (2005); MO. REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE A NN. § 5020-111 (2005); NEB. REV . STAT . § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV . STAT . §
632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT . ANN . § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT . § 305-2 (2006); N.Y. C IV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN . STAT .
§ 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT . CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV . CODE
ANN . § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA . STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); OR. REV .
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sterilization.6 More recently, these laws have been applied to
pharmacists’ refusal to fill prescriptions for birth control.7 The
various conscientious objection laws8 that have been enacted within

STAT . § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.225 (2006); 18 PA . CONS.
STAT . § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE A NN. §
44-41-50 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TEX . OCC. CODE
ANN . § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA.
CODE ANN . § 18.2-75 (2006); W ASH. REV . CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W IS.
STAT . § 253.09 (2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN. § 42-5-101 (2006).
6
745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4 (2005); MD. CODE A NN., H EALTH-GEN . §
20-214 (West 2006); MASS. A NN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); N.J.
STAT . ANN . § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006);
T ENN . C ODE ANN . § 68-34-104 (2005); W IS. STAT . § 253.09 (2006).
7
See Karissa Eide, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control
Prescriptions on Moral or Religious Grounds?, 42 CAL . W. L. REV . 121,
132–36 (2005) (describing the practice of pharmacists refusing to fill birth
control prescriptions and arguing against this practice); see also Holly Teliska,
Recent Development: Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses
Undermine the Basic Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 240–43 (2005) (arguing that allowing
pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions is harmful to women).
8
ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ . REV . STAT . A NN. § 36-2151
(2006); ARK. CODE . A NN . § 20-16-304 (2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 123420 (West 2006); COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV .
STAT . § 25-6-102 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); FLA . STAT .
§ 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); HAW . REV . STAT . §
453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN . § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT .
70/4 (2005); IND . CODE § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KAN.
STAT . ANN . § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV . STAT . ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006);
LA. REV . STAT . A NN. § 40:1299.31 (2006); ME. REV . STAT. ANN . tit. 22, §
1903 (2005); MD . CODE ANN., H EALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS.
ANN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.20181 (2006); MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41107-5 (2006); MO . R EV . S TAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT . CODE ANN . § 50-20111 (2005); NEB. REV . STAT . § 28-338 (2005); NEV . REV. STAT . § 632.475
(2006); N.J. STAT . ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT . § 30-5-2
(2006); N.Y. C IV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN . STAT . §
14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT . CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV . CODE ANN .
§ 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA . STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); OR. REV . STAT .
§ 435.485 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.225 (2006); 18 PA . CONS. STAT . §
3213 (2005); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50
(2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TENN . C ODE ANN . § 68-34-

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION CLAUSES

2/11/08 9:39 PM

229

forty-six states can be categorized into four groups: (1)
conscientious objection laws that do not apply to birth control;9
(2) conscientious objection laws that could apply to birth control;10
(3) statutes that apply to birth control but do not clearly apply to
pharmacists;11 and (4) statutes that clearly apply to both birth
control and pharmacists.12
Conscientious objection laws which do not apply to birth
control13 nevertheless adopt the same principle as laws that permit

104 (2005); TEX . OCC. CODE A NN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE
ANN . § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN . § 18.2-75 (2006); W ASH . REV .
CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W. VA . CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); W IS. STAT . §
253.09 (2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN. § 42-5-101 (2006).
9
ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ . REV . STAT . A NN. § 36-2151
(2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); HAW . REV .
STAT . § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN . § 18-612 (2006); IND. CODE § 1634-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); K AN. S TAT . A NN. § 65-443 (2006);
KY. REV . STAT . ANN . § 311.800 (West 2006); LA . R EV. STAT . ANN . §
40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MO.
REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB.
REV . STAT . § 28-338 (2005); NEV . REV . STAT . § 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT .
ANN . § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. STAT . § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV .
R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. G EN. STAT . § 14-45.1 (2006);
N.D. CENT . C ODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV . C ODE A NN. § 4731.91 (West
2006); OKLA . STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. C ONS. STAT . § 3213
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50
(2005); TEX . OCC. CODE ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); W IS. STAT . § 253.09
(2006).
10
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1791 (West 2006); MD . CODE ANN .,
HEALTH-GEN . § 20-214 (2006).
11
COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV . STAT . § 25-6-102
(2005); GA. CODE ANN . § 49-7-6 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4 (2005);
ME . REV . STAT . ANN . tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); OR. REV. STAT . § 435.225
(2006); TENN . CODE ANN . § 68-34-104 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4
(2006).
12
ARK. CODE . ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT . § 381.0051 (2006);
MISS. CODE ANN . § 41-107-5 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006);
W ASH . REV . C ODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN . § 42-5-101 (2006).
13
ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); ARIZ. REV . STAT. § 36-2151
(2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); HAW . REV .
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pharmacists to refuse to fill a customer’s prescription—the idea
that a person should not be forced to help another engage in
conduct the person believes is wrong or immoral.14 Most of these
STAT . § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN . § 18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KAN. STAT. A NN. § 65-443
(2006); KY. REV . STAT . ANN. § 311.800 (West 2006); LA. REV . STAT . ANN.
§ 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006); MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MO.
REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB.
REV . STAT . ANN . § 28-338 (2005); NEV. REV . STAT . A NN. § 632.475 (2006);
N.J. STAT . A NN . § 2A:65A-1 (West 2006); N.M. S TAT . A NN. § 30-5-2 (2006);
N.Y. C IV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT . § 14-45.1
(2006); N.D. CENT . CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. §
4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA . STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA . CONS.
STAT . § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE A NN. §
44-41-50 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN . §
18.2-75 (2006); W IS. S TAT . § 253.09 (2006).
14
The conscientious objection laws for abortion and sterilization that do not
apply to birth control came first, and many of the laws that do apply to birth
control seem to use similar language to the earlier statutes. Also, most of the
states with laws that apply to birth control first had laws that applied to
abortion. The 31 states that have conscientious objection laws that do not apply
to birth control are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010
(2006); ARIZ . REV . STAT . § 36-2151 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
123420 (West 2006); H AW . R EV . S TAT . § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE A NN. §
18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN . § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1
(2005); KAN. STAT . A NN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV . STAT. ANN . § 311.800
(West 2006); LA. REV . STAT . ANN . § 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN . LAWS
ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH . COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006);
MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MO . REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT.
CODE ANN . § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. REV . STAT . A NN. § 28-338 (2005);
NEV. REV . STAT . ANN . § 632.475 (2006); N.J. STAT . ANN . § 2A:65A-1
(West 2006); N.M. S TAT . A NN . § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. C IV . R IGHTS LAW § 79I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN . S TAT . § 14-45.1 (2006); N.D. CENT . CODE §
23-16-14 (2006); OHIO REV . CODE ANN . § 4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA .
STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT . § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-50 (2005); TEX . OCC.
CODE ANN. § 103.002 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE A NN. § 76-7-306 (2006);
VA. CODE A NN. § 18.2-75 (2006); W IS. S TAT . § 253.09 (2006).
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laws allow physicians or any other person involved with an
abortion procedure to refuse to participate without fear of legal or
job-related consequences.15 As a precondition to refusing, such
laws generally require the conscientious objector to have some
legitimate reason for objecting.16 Acceptable reasons include some
combination of moral, ethical, or religious conflict, or alternatively,
personal reasons accompanied by the belief that it will cause the
death of an unborn child.17
15

ALASKA STAT . § 18.16.010 (2006); CAL . H EALTH & S AFETY CODE §
123420 (West 2006); H AW . R EV . S TAT . § 453-16 (2006); IDAHO CODE A NN. §
18-612 (2006); IND. CODE ANN . § 16-34-1-5 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1
(2005); KAN. STAT . A NN. § 65-443 (2006); KY. REV . STAT. ANN . § 311.800
(West 2006); LA. REV . STAT . ANN . § 40:1299.31 (2006); MASS. ANN . LAWS
ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MICH . COMP. LAWS § 333.20181 (2006);
MINN . STAT . § 145.414 (2005); MO . REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT.
CODE ANN . § 50-20-111 (2005); NEB. REV . STAT . A NN. § 28-338 (2005);
NEV. REV . STAT . ANN. § 632.475 (2006); N.M. STAT . ANN. § 30-5-2 (2006);
N.Y. C IV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT . § 14-45.1
(2006); N.D. CENT . CODE § 23-16-14 (2006); OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. §
4731.91 (West 2006); OKLA . STAT . tit. 63, § 1-741 (2005); 18 PA . CONS.
STAT . § 3213 (2005); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.C. CODE A NN. §
44-41-50 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN . §
18.2-75 (2006); W IS. S TAT . § 253.09 (2006).
16
ARIZ . REV . STAT . § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE . ANN. § 20-16-304
(2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO . REV .
STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO . R EV . S TAT . § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA . S TAT . §
381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN . § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN . § 18612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4 (2005); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005);
KY. REV . STAT . A NN. § 311.800 (West 2006); ME . REV . STAT . A NN. tit. 22,
§ 1903 (2005); MD . CODE ANN., H EALTH-GEN . § 20-214 (West 2006); MASS.
ANN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (Lexis Nexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-5
(2006); MO. REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111
(2005); NEV. REV . STAT . ANN . § 632.475 (2006); N.M. S TAT. ANN. § 30-5-2
(2006); N.Y. CIV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT . §
14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV. STAT . § 435.225
(2006); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70
(2006); TENN . CODE A NN. § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-306
(2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2006); W ASH. R EV. CODE A NN. §
48.43.065 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); W IS. STAT . § 253.09
(2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN. § 42-5-101 (2006).
17
ARIZ. REV . STAT . ANN. § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE . ANN. § 20-16304 (2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO .
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The second category of statutes permit conscientious objection
in circumstances involving the “termination of pregnancy” but do
not include accompanying definitions of pregnancy. 18 The absence
of a legal definition of pregnancy permits objecting pharmacists to
use to their advantage the ambiguity of what constitutes
“termination of pregnancy.” For example, despite the medical
definition of pregnancy which occurs at implantation,19 if a
pharmacist believes pregnancy occurs at fertilization, the use of
birth control could be considered a termination of pregnancy. 20
REV . STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA.
STAT . § 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN . § 18-612 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4 (2005); IOWA CODE §
146.1 (2005); KY. REV . STAT . ANN . § 311.800 (West 2006); ME. REV . STAT .
ANN . tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); MD. CODE ANN ., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West
2006); MASS. ANN . LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (LexisNexis 2006); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-107-5 (2006); MO. REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-20-111 (2005); NEV . REV . STAT . ANN . § 632.475 (2006); N.M. STAT .
ANN . § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. C IV . RIGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT . § 14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV .
STAT . § 435.225 (2006); R.I. GEN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); TENN . CODE ANN. § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE
ANN . § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE ANN . § 18.2-75 (2006); W ASH . REV .
CODE ANN. § 48.43.065 (2006); W. V A. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006); W IS. STAT .
§ 253.09 (2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN . § 42-5-101 (2006).
18
DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 24, § 1791 (2006); MD. CODE ANN ., H EALTHGEN. § 20-214 (West 2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.485 (2006).
19
BENJAMIN F. MILLER & CLAIRE BRACKMAN KEANE , ENCYCLOPEDIA
AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE , NURSING , AND ALLIED HEALTH 406 (7th ed.
2003) (“Conception 1. The onset of pregnancy, marked by implantation of the
blastocyst, the formation of a viable zygote.”); 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
MEDICINE 254 (John Walton et al. eds., 1986) (“Conception. The fertilization
of an ovum by a spermatozoon and the implantation of the resulting zygote.”);
DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL D ICTIONARY 365 (W.B. Saunders Co.,
28th ed. 1994) (“Conception 1. The onset of pregnancy, marked by
implantation of the blastocyst in the endometrium, the formation of a visible
zygote.”).
20
Teresa Menart, The Challenge of Contraception for Those Who Respect
Life, http://www.omsoul.com/pamview.php?idnum=105 (last visited Mar. 17,
2007); Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. T IMES, May 7, 2006,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/magazine/07contraception.
html?ei=5070&en=e19e857aa8b70359&ex=1173758400&pagewanted=all.;
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Therefore, depending on the definition of pregnancy, these types
of statutes may allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions.
Other conscientious objection laws clearly apply to birth
control but do not necessarily apply to pharmacists. 21 This
category of conscientious objection laws permits medical personnel
to conscientiously object to birth control. For example, Maine’s
and Tennessee’s statutes apply to private physicians, institutions,
and their staffs.22 Any pharmacist who works for a private
physician or institution would enjoy the benefit of the laws.
Similarly, West Virginia’s statute applies only to state employees
and allows these pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions. 23
Finally, five states have conscientious objection laws that
clearly apply to both birth control and pharmacists. 24 For
example, Arkansas’ conscientious objection law, ironically a
provision of a statute ensuring access to contraception, 25 upholds
ChristianAnswers.net, Can Birth Control Pills Kill Unborn Babies,
http://www.christiananswers.net/q-eden/edn-bcpill.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2007); see infra Part III.A.
21
COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-207 (2005); COLO. REV . STAT . § 25-6-102
(2005); GA. CODE ANN . § 49-7-6 (2006); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT . 70/4 (2005);
ME . REV . STAT . ANN . tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); OR. REV. STAT . § 435.225
(2006); TENN . CODE ANN . § 68-34-104 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4
(2006).
22
ME . REV . STAT . ANN . tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); TENN . CODE ANN. § 6834-104(5) (2005) (“No private institution or physician, nor any agent or
employee of such institution or physician, shall be prohibited from refusing to
provide contraceptive procedures, supplies, and information when such refusal is
based upon religious or conscientious objection, and no such institution,
employee, agent, or physician shall be held liable for such refusal.”).
23
W. V A . CODE § 16-2B-4 (2006). West Virginia’s statute says in part:
“Any employee of the State of West Virginia or any of its agencies or political
subdivisions, including, but not limited to, local health or welfare agencies,
may refuse to accept the duty of offering family planning services to the extent
that such duty is contrary to his personal religious beliefs.” Id.
24
ARK. CODE . ANN. § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT . § 381.0051 (2006);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006); W ASH. REV. CODE ANN . §
48.43.065 (2006); W YO . S TAT . A NN . § 42-5-101 (2006).
25
ARK. CODE . A NN . § 20-16-304 (2006).
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pharmacists’ rights to object: “Nothing in this subchapter shall
prohibit a physician, pharmacist, or any other authorized
paramedical personnel from refusing to furnish any contraceptive
procedures, supplies, or information.”26
Another clear, though more complex, statute is found in South
Dakota’s conscientious objection law. This law provides:
No pharmacist may be required to dispense medication
if there is reason to believe that the medication would be
used to:
(1) Cause an abortion; or
(2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision
22-1-2(50A); or
(3) Cause the death of any person by means of an
assisted suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing.
No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this
section may be the basis for any claim for damages
against the pharmacist or the pharmacy of the
pharmacist or the basis for any disciplinary,
recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the
pharmacist. 27
Subsequent provisions of South Dakota’s laws define “unborn
child” as “an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from
fertilization until live birth.”28 Because it has been maintained that
the birth control pill can be used to prevent implantation,29 the
statute clearly permits pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions.

26

Id.
S.D. C ODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
28
S.D. C ODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2006).
29
Marian Block, & Marvin C. Rulin, Managing Patients on Oral
Contraceptives, 32 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 154, 154–55 (1985); Jennifer
Johnsen, The Pill, (Mar. 1, 2006), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/birthcontrol-pregnancy/birth-control/the-pill.htm; Ortho Women’s Health and
Urology, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.thepill.com/html/ppil/faq.jsp
(last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
27
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II. T HE FIRST AMENDMENT’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE
This section explores the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and conscientious objection statutes and the
extent to which the Establishment Clause applies to such statutes.
This section also provides a useful overview of Establishment
Clause Supreme Court case law. Whether these conscientious
objection clauses violate the Establishment Clause is particularly
important because pharmacists often refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions for religious reasons.30 Accordingly, conscientious
objector clauses violate the requirement of the separation of church
and state.
A. A History of Supreme Court Establishment Clause Case
Law
There are two clauses in the First Amendment related to the
practice of religion: (1) the Establishment Clause and (2) the Free
Exercise of Religion Clause.31 It is commonly recognized that the
Establishment Clause is intended to prevent the Federal or State
governments from establishing an official church or religion.32 The
30

See Cantor & Baum, supra note 1; Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the
Line: The Legal, Ethical and Public Policy Implications of Refusal Clauses for
Pharmacists, 48 ARIZ . L. REV . 469, 470–72 (2006); Jed Miller, The
Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists’ Consciences and
Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 H EALTH MATRIX 237, 237–39 (2006).
31
U.S. C ONST . amend. I.
32
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 219 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839, 842 (1995); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587, 599 (1992); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,
15, 20 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 672, 673, 678 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968); Sch. Dist. of
Abington, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215–16 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 429–430 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441–42
(1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); Illinois ex Rel.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No.71, Champaign, Ill., 333 U.S.

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

236

2/11/08 9:39 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Free Exercise of Religion Clause is intended to protect individuals’
rights to worship, provided individuals act within certain
restrictions such as the practice of polygamy33 or the use of peyote
for religious purposes.34 Notably, supporters of conscientious
objector laws contend the Establishment Clause protects
pharmacists’ right to object.35 This article focuses upon the
Establishment Clause and the implications of Establishment Clause
case law regarding the question of statutes, instead of focusing on
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause.
In 1943, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case
Murdock v. Pennsylvania.36 Around the turn of the century, the
city of Jeannette, Pennsylvania passed a law requiring that anyone
canvassing or soliciting goods or orders for goods must first obtain
a license from the government at a fee based upon the requested
duration of the solicitation.37 Without obtaining a license,
Jehovah’s Witnesses went door-to-door in Jeannette encouraging
people to “purchase”38 religious books and pamphlets. 39 None of
203, 212 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1,
14–15 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878); DANIEL
DREISBACH, T HOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE W ALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN
CHURCH AND STATE 62, 66–67, 125–26 (2003).
33
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145 (upholding a federal law making polygamy
illegal, despite a legal challenge from a Mormon who claimed it was his
religious duty to practice polygamy).
34
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (arguing laws
banning the use of peyote for any reason, religious or otherwise, do not
unconstitutionally restrict one’s right to the free exercise of religion).
35
See, e.g., Tony J. Kriesel, Pharmacists and the “Morning-After Pill”:
Creating Room for Conscience Behind the Counter, 7 MINN . J.L. SCI . &
T ECH. 337 (2005); Courtney Miller, Reflections on Protecting Conscience for
Health Care Providers: A Call for More Inclusive Statutory Protection in Light
of Constitutional Considerations, 15 S. CAL . REV . L. & SOCIAL JUSTICE 327
(2006); Jessica J. Nelson, Freedom of Choice for Everyone: The Need for
Conscience Clause Legislation for Pharmacists, 3 U. ST . THOMAS L.J. 139
(2005).
36
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
37
Id. at 106.
38
The word “purchase” in addition to the words “sales” and
“contributions” was in quotes in the original opinion by Justice Douglas
(belying the Court’s ultimate opinion), and thus the use of quotes is maintained

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION CLAUSES

2/11/08 9:39 PM

237

them had obtained the license, though they had “sold” the
materials.40 A group of them were convicted and fined for violating
the ordinance, and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
ruling.41 The Jehovah’s Witnesses argued that their conviction
under the ordinance “deprived them of the freedom of speech,
press, and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”42
Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to hear their
appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari to hear the case.43
The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that the
law violated the appellants’ right to practice their religion.44 Not
only did Murdock unequivocally hold that the Establishment
Clause protections of the First Amendment apply directly to the
states, 45 it also held that a law not specifically directed at religious
organizations could still violate the First Amendment’s protections
of religion.46 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas reasoned that
by evangelizing door-to-door, the Jehovah’s Witnesses were
here.
39

Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 107.
43
Id. The Court details a more robust version of the background events to
the case. See generally id. at 106–07.
44
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116–17 (1943).
45
Id. at 108. Despite this discussion in Murdock, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940), which precedes Murdock by three years, appears to be the
first case in which the Supreme Court ruled that the 14th Amendment applies
the 1st Amendment to the states. Id. at 303 (“The fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”) (footnote omitted). The fact pattern in
Cantwell is similar to Murdock; however, the Establishment Clause discussion
in Murdock is more robust for the purposes of this article. Cantwell, like
Murdock, involves Jehovah’s Witnesses who went door-to-door with a record
player spreading their religious message and selling religious books or
collecting donations. Id. at 301. The Connecticut statute under which the
Jehovah’s Witnesses were charged is substantially similar to the one at issue in
Murdock. The court overturned the statute in Cantwell, as in Murdock. Id. at
301–02, 310–11.
46
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115–17.
40
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engaging in a religious practice akin to going to church for other
religious groups. 47 Although the Court recognized that state
governments may constitutionally enforce financial regulations
against religious organizations, the Court held that Jehovah’s
Witnesses presented a special case given their specific beliefs and
thus deserved special protection in the present case.48 The Court
further explained that to tax Jehovah’s Witnesses for their door-todoor solicitations would be akin to either taxing them for the right
to worship or taxing a Minister for the right to preach to his or her
congregation.49
The Court further elaborated on the meaning of separation of
church and state in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township
of Ewing.50 The issue in Everson was whether a state could
reimburse parents for public transportation used to carry children
to school, regardless of whether the children attended public or
Catholic school.51 A taxpayer sued arguing that the reimbursement
to the parents of Catholic school52 kids constituted an
impermissible establishment of religion under the First
Amendment.53 The Supreme Court of New Jersey struck down the
law as unconstitutional, but the Court of Errors reversed.54
Ultimately the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Errors opinion, ruling that the law was enforceable as written.55
Justice Black, writing the majority opinion, reasoned that
47

Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 112. According to Justice Douglas, the Jehovah’s Witnesses
represent a special case because they are a religious group that is being held
exempt from a specific financial regulation due to their religious beliefs regarding
one’s religious duty to engage in “missionary evangelism.” Id. Not all religions
are exempt from financial regulations, just the Jehovah’s Witnesses with respect
to what had amounted to a tax on their ability to perform their religious duties.
Id. The specific theological beliefs, combined with the impact of the tax, created
the special case for Jehovah’s Witnesses. Id.
49
Id. at 113–14.
50
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3.
53
Id. at 3–4.
54
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 44 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1945).
55
Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18.
48
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although “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment . . . [prohibits] the Federal Government [from
setting] . . . up a church . . . [, it cannot] pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”56 In
other words, government legislation and policies must remain
neutral regarding religion. Nevertheless, in limiting this holding,
Black seemed to make the argument that legislation which has a
“secular purpose” can be justified, apart from any effect it has on
religion.57 Hence, in Everson, because the purpose of the law was
to ensure the safe transportation of children to school and had
nothing to do with supporting the Catholic Church, it constituted a
valid secular state concern regarding the public welfare.58
The Supreme Court further strengthened the line between
church and state in 1948 with its decision in Illinois Ex Rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71.59 The
plaintiffs in McCollum were a taxpayer and mother of a student
whose school permitted children, with their parents’ permission, to
attend religious classes during the school day and on school
property. 60 The Court struck down the law as violating both
religious clauses of the First Amendment61 and explained the
connection between the state and religion was too close.62 The
Court warned that religious institutions and the state are best
separated and that states could not “utilize [their] public school
system[s] to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the
dissemination of their doctrines and ideals . . . .”63 The Court
further reasoned that the law lacked a legitimate government
purpose as justification for the practice in question.64 McCollum
serves to emphasize the Court’s disapproval of laws that allow
state power to aid a religious sect in promoting its message.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
Id.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 211.
Id.
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The Court limited the scope of the First Amendment four years
later in Zorach v. Clauson.65 Despite the consideration of a similar
statute as was at issue in McCollum, the Court upheld the statute
in Zorach because the religious instruction, though scheduled
during school hours, occurred outside of school property. 66 Justice
Douglas admitted that although the mere allowance of religious
instruction during school hours did not amount to a constitutional
violation, “[g]overnment may not finance religious groups nor
undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian
education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion
on any person.”67 While differentiating Zorach from McCollum and
allowing the religious instruction in Zorach, the Court reaffirmed
its disapproval of laws allowing state power to be used to aid
religious instruction or the spreading of a specific religion’s beliefs.
In 1961, the Court examined the validity of the Sunday Blue
Law—a statute prohibiting the sale of goods on Sunday. 68 The
Court upheld the law and ruled that secular purposes—the
furtherance of public health and economics—could justify such
statutes. 69 In addition, the Court noted that the Blue Laws had no
coercive effect upon people to go to church and be religious, and
thus the law did not constitute state promotion of religion.70 The
65

343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Id. at 311–12, 314–15.
67
Id. at 314.
68
Id. at 422.
69
Id. at 433–35. Chief Justice Warren gives examples of public health and
well-being arguments as having been historically used to justify Blue Laws.
Here the argument is that a day of rest is good for public health and it provides
time that families can spend together, which is also good for public well-being.
In addition, Warren recounts an economic justification given for Blue Laws that
claims a day of rest is good for workers as it allows them to recuperate from a
week’s worth of work, and thus makes them more productive when they do
work. Clearly the pubic health and well-being argument and the economic
argument go well beyond the original religious justifications offered for the Blue
Laws. Id.
70
Id. at 452. Here, Warren makes explicit reference to McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), discussed earlier in this
section, as it is the only case in the then-scant Supreme Court jurisprudence
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In
66
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Court cautiously noted, however, that Blue Laws could violate the
Establishment Clause if they promoted, or were intended to
promote, a particular religion or religious belief.71
After years of a piecemeal approach to Establishment Clause
analysis, the Court created its first test in School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp.72 In explaining the
test, the Court wrote:
What are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of
religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.73
The focus of an Establishment Clause inquiry is the purpose and
intent of the law. A statute could only withstand the inquiry if it
has a secular legislative purpose and an underlying nonreligious
intent. 74 The Court then used the test to strike down two state
statutes. The first statute required public school students to start
school with a recitation from the Bible and a Christian prayer. 75
The other statute gave students the option to read from the Bible
McCollum, the Court concluded that schools were being used as a governmental
sanction of a specific religion and, more importantly, that the sanction provided
coercive force toward pushing specific religious beliefs upon children. Unlike
McCollum, Warren argues, McGowan had no coercive force in the Blue Laws.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 452 (1952).
71
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 453.
72
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
73
Id.
74
Id. Recall the discussion of Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), earlier in this section. At issue in Everson was the
public support for busing children to public and parochial schools. The Court
ruled that the busing had the secular purpose of transporting children safely to
school and did not advance the interest of the Catholic faith by helping to
transport children to Catholic schools. In this respect, Clark’s test comports
with the ruling in Everson and formalizes the Court’s logic into its first attempt
at a clearly delineated Establishment Clause test.
75
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206.
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or recite the prayer.76
Building upon the Schempp test, the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman77 created the modern-day Establishment Clause
standard.78 First, the court cited three purposes behind the
Establishment Clause: prevention of (1) state sponsorship of
religion; (2) state financial support of religion; and (3) active state
involvement in religious activity.79 Next, the court established its
three-pronged test: “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”80
The third part of the test is most central to the analysis.
According to Lemon, to determine excessive entanglement, courts
must “examine the character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority.”81 The court further elaborated that if a program required
a large amount of government oversight or regulation of a religious
body to maintain the separation of church and state, the oversight
would be evidence of excessive entanglement; thus, the law would
be unconstitutional pursuant to the first amendment. 82
76

Id. at 203.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78
See John Gay, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing a New Relationship
Between Church and State, 39 AM. U.L. REV . 953 (1989); see also Matthew
D. Donovan, Religion, Neutrality, and the Public School Curriculum: Equal
Treatment or Separation?, 43 CATH . LAW . 187 (2004).
79
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
80
Id. at 612–13. (internal citations omitted)
81
Id. at 615.
82
Id. at 620. It is important to notice that Burger’s stricture clearly limits
states’ allowance of religious figures into public schools. However, the rule also
limits excessive government regulation of religious schools. This is not to say
that the government cannot place certain restrictions on parochial schools, rather
it is to say that only the most basic restrictions can be placed on parochial
schools. Apart from these basic restrictions, these religiously based schools have
plenty of leeway to make their own governing rules. In this sense, although
Lemon in some ways limits religious teachings (in public schools), it also
77
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One example of a subsequent application of the Lemon test is
Wallace v. Jaffree.83 Here, the Court struck down an Alabama law
authorizing public school teachers to hold a one-minute period of
silence for meditation or prayer and allowing teachers to lead
willing children in prayer.84 The Court wrote: “A system which
secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological
causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to
foster such concepts.”85 In other words, the religion clauses of the
First Amendment work both to protect religion as well as to
protect those who choose not to follow a particular religion.86 The
grants extra freedom to religious schools to govern their own institutions.
83
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 51. Similarly, the Court stated, “[a]s is plain from its text, the
First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with
the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience,” id. at 49, which further
explains the Court’s take on governmental involvement with respect to religious
issues or questions of conscience.
86
In particular, the Wallace Court explained:
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of a broader concept of individual
freedom of mind, so also the individual’s freedom to choose his
own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting
the creed established by the majority. At one time it was thought
that this right merely proscribed the preference of one Christian
sect over another, but would not require equal respect for the
conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a nonChristian faith such as Islam or Judaism. But when the underlying
principle has been examined in the crucible of litigation, the Court
has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right
to select any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives
support not only from the interest in respecting the individual’s
freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious
beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that the
political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond
intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance among
“religions”—to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the
uncertain.
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Court concluded that the state clearly intended to endorse
religion,87 and given the law’s allowance for teachers to lead prayer,
it constituted the promotion of a specific religion against the
wishes of those who chose not to participate in the prayer. 88
Thus, the Court held that the Alabama law failed the first prong of
the Lemon test because the law did not have a secular purpose.
III. T HE L EMON T EST AND C ONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
STATUTES: A FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE?
This section evaluates whether conscientious objection laws
that explicitly allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions violate the Establishment Clause as interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Lemon.89 The discussion applies the Lemon
test to one of the most controversial of these statutes—that of
South Dakota, outlined in Part I. 90 As applied to the Lemon test,
the South Dakota conscientious objection law, as well as analogous
statutes, should be struck down because such laws lack a secular
purpose.91
Statutes which explicitly cite religion as permissible grounds for
a pharmacist’s refusal deserve the most scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause.92 The justification for an Establishment
Id. at 52–54.
87
Id. at 56–60. Indeed, the representative who introduced the bill said for
the legislative record that it was his sole intent to bring back prayer in public
schools. During its analysis, the Court determined the intent of the law was
either to return prayer to public schools or the bill had no point at all, which
was unlikely. Accordingly, the Court deemed the law to be unconstitutional.
88
Id. at 56.
89
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
90
South Dakota’s statute, like the other statutes in the fourth category of
statutes discussed in Part I, explicitly permits pharmacists to refuse to fill a birth
control prescription on the grounds that it violates the pharmacist’s religious
beliefs.
91
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
92
ARIZ . REV . STAT . A NN. § 36-2151 (2006); ARK. CODE . ANN. § 20-16304 (2006); CAL . HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420 (West 2006); COLO .

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION CLAUSES

2/11/08 9:39 PM

245

Clause inquiry is less clear for less explicit statutes, such as that of
South Dakota. Is this statute religious in nature, and therefore
unconstitutional, or is it merely primarily used by religious
REV . STAT .§ 25-6-207 (2005), COLO . REV . STAT . § 25-6-102 (2005); FLA.
STAT . § 381.0051 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN . § 18-612 (2006); IOWA CODE § 146.1 (2005); KY. REV . STAT . ANN . §
311.800 (West 2006); ME . REV . STAT . A NN. tit. 22, § 1903 (2005); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12I (2006); MO . REV . STAT . § 197.032 (2006); MONT .
CODE ANN . § 50-20-111 (2005); NEV. REV . STAT . § 632.475 (2006); N.M.
STAT . § 30-5-2 (2006); N.Y. CIV . R IGHTS LAW § 79-I (McKinney 2006); N.C.
GEN. STAT . § 14-45.1 (2006); OR. REV . STAT . § 435.485 (2006); OR. REV .
STAT . § 435.225 (2006); R.I. G EN . LAWS § 23-17-11 (2006); T ENN . CODE
ANN . § 68-34-104 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-7-306 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN . § 18.2-75 (2006); W ASH. R EV . C ODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W. V A. C ODE
§ 16-2B-4 (2006); W IS. STAT . § 253.09 (2006); W YO . STAT. ANN . § 42-5-101
(2006).
Most of these 26 states provide multiple reasons for objection, one of which
is a person’s religious beliefs (but not all 26 statutes necessarily apply to
pharmacists and birth control, as was discussed supra Part II). However,
Georgia’s and West Virginia’s statutes list religious objections as being the
only grounds upon which pharmacists may object to the filling of a birth control
prescription. These two statutes are blatantly unconstitutional in that they place
a premium on religious belief over non-belief, and they do not allow for
conscientious objection based on personal or moral grounds. See Everson, 330
U.S. at 15 (stating “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: . . . Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”) (emphasis
added); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212 (quoting the plaintiff, in support, as
saying the law in question in Schempp “violated [plaintiffs’, who are atheists,]
rights ‘in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief
as against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the
majority . . . .’”); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 358–59 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (stating “If the exemption is to be given application, it
must encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those whose
beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The
common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction with which a
belief is held. Common experience teaches that among ‘religious’ individuals
some are weak and others strong adherents to tenets and this is no less true of
individuals whose lives are guided by personal ethical considerations”) (citations
omitted). Nonetheless, the focus of this section, and the article as a whole, are
not these two outliers but rather the other conscientious objection clauses for
pharmacists. Accordingly, this section will focus on these other statutes to
determine their constitutionality.
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objectors as justification for their actions?
A. The South Dakota Law Implicates the Establishment Clause
Before examining the law under the Lemon test, it must be
demonstrated that the Establishment Clause applies.93 Essentially,
there must be a religious aspect to the law.94 One indication that
the South Dakota statute relies upon religious motivation is that
the definition of unborn child used in the accompanying statute is
inconsistent with the standard medical definitions for when
pregnancy has begun. For example, the American Medical
Association (AMA) defines pregnancy as beginning with
implantation rather than fertilization.95 The American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Committee on Ethics similarly
defines pregnancy as beginning with implantation, not
fertilization.96 Indeed, the Committee defines pregnancy as
occurring in the implantation stage because the embryo at the time
of fertilization through implantation lacks clear “biologic
93

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602. The Lemon test is an Establishment Clause
test; therefore, without first demonstrating that the conscientious objector laws
invoke Establishment Clause legal claims, any application of the Lemon test
would seem inappropriate.
94
Id.
95
See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REPRODUCTION 986 (Ernst Knobil & Jimmy
D. Neill eds., 1998) (explaining that “[f]ollowing implantation an orchestrated
sequence of events occurs local to and distant from the fetoplacental unit leading
to the altered physiological state of pregnancy.”). Based on the quotation given,
in addition to the accompanying section of the cited source, pregnancy is
understood to be a vague state consistent of a number of physiological changes
that occur within the woman's body. Id. As the text explains, and as the quoted
section implies, these physiological changes occur over a protracted period of
time, but the important changes constituting pregnancy do not occur until after
implantation. Id. The implications are that pregnancy need not begin with
implantation, but it certainly cannot be said to medically begin before
implantation. Id.
96
Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives:
Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L.
37, 44, n. 82 (2006) (citing AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, PREEMBRYONIC RESEARCH:
HISTORY, SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND , AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 1 (No.
136, Apr. 1994)).
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individuality necessary for a concrete potentiality to become a
human person, even though it does possess a unique human
genotype.”97 Nothing exists which amounts to a full human life at
the time of implantation.98
Departing from these definitions, South Dakota’s legislature
defines “unborn child” as existing after fertilization rather than
implantation.99 Instead of following the medical definition, South
Dakota’s definition is consistent with the beliefs of a majority of
Christian sects.100 More importantly, not only is the definition
fairly characterized at Christian, but it is also contrary to Judaism’s
and Islam’s beliefs about the use of contraception and the beginning
of life.101 Given the overlap between the Christian definition of life
97

Id.
Given the similarity of definitions, one could argue the AMA agrees with
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Committee on
Ethics’ assessment, but the AMA has tried very hard not to make any definitive
statements on such a controversial subject.
99
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (2007). Technically, the South
Dakota legislature chose not to use the medical definition of pregnancy, as the
AMA and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists do not
define “life.” The AMA offers up qualifications for the beginning of a pregnancy,
but they do not explicitly tackle the more philosophical question of the moment
that life begins. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REPRODUCTION, supra note 95. The
South Dakota legislature, however, has defined life, and has explicitly linked the
definition of life to fertilization. In light of the medical profession’s failure to
recognize a pregnancy at the point of fertilization, let alone a life, it seems fair to
say the South Dakota legislature has rejected the medical definition of life. Were
there to be a medical definition of life, it clearly would not be fertilization as this
is not even a medical pregnancy yet.
100
See Collins, supra note 96 at, 44–45. Collins points out that the most
obvious example of a Christian sect that is anti-contraception is the Catholic
Church. Collins associates the Catholic belief that life begins when the egg is
fertilized with the Christian definition of life (fertilization of the egg), although
Catholics are not the only Christian sect to hold this belief. Protestants also
have a long tradition of opposing “unnatural” means of contraception. While
some Protestant sects are now more open to birth control, this certainly does not
apply to all Protestants. Presbyterians and Baptists, in particular, are still very
much against the use of contraception. See also HAROLD S PEERT, OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY IN AMERICA , A H ISTORY 445, 447 (1980).
101
Collins, supra note 96, at 45–46. Collins argues that Orthodox Judaism
allows the use of the Pill, although not surgical methods to prevent pregnancies.
98
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and that used in the South Dakota statute, the statute furthers a
religious purpose—the enforcement of Christian beliefs forbidding
the use of birth control.102 Therefore, the South Dakota
conscientious objection law violates the Establishment Clause.
B. The Application of the Lemon Test
Because the statute is religious in nature, it warrants an
Establishment Clause analysis. 103 Given the Court’s primary
reliance upon the three-pronged Lemon test, 104 the South Dakota
conscientious objection law must satisfy the standard developed in
Lemon. 105 Finally, it deserves mention that a valid statute must
meet all three prongs of the Lemon test.106
1.

The First Prong of the Lemon Test

The first prong of the Lemon test requires that “the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose . . . .”107 Stated otherwise,
the statute must have a secular purpose that could justify using
Id. at 44–45. Because the issue is the refusal to fill birth control prescriptions,
the Pill is at issue, and the fact that the Orthodox Jewish idea of life and
conception does not bar the use of the Pill further indicates that the definition
used by South Dakota is not only non-medical, but it is not generic with respect
to other religions. This religious bias is further emphasized by the fact that
Islam “view[s] [an] embryo as potential, rather than an actual, life,” and thus
affords it less consideration than a full life. Id. at 46. As such, there is nothing
about the use of contraceptives, in particular the Pill, that would go against
Islamic teachings, whereas some Christian sects do believe the use of
contraceptives is against God’s will, or at the very least religious doctrine. See
ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ISLAM AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 116–17
(1982).
102
Or at the very least the purpose could fairly be assessed as allowing
Christian pharmacists and those that agree with the Christian definition of life to
impose their views on customers with valid birth control prescriptions by
refusing to fill such prescriptions.
103
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 612.

K UBASEK F INAL DRAFT A UTHORIZED .DOC

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION CLAUSES

2/11/08 9:39 PM

249

what appears to be a Christian definition of life, instead of the
medical definition.108
The relevant inquiry with respect to the first prong of the
Lemon test is whether there is a secular justification for the South
Dakota legislature’s decision to link conception with fertilization
and not with implantation.109 Justice Stevens offers some guidance
regarding this relevant inquiry in his dissent 110 in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services. 111 Justice Stevens’ analysis—the
108

See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961) (indicating that a
law that is religious in origin is not necessarily unconstitutional if it has a
secular purpose, such as the Maryland Blue Laws in question in McGowan).
109
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
110
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989). Justice
Stevens concurred in part (to the third holding, which was unanimous) and
dissented in part (to holdings one and two, which were decided by a five to four
margin). The discussion below reviews the plurality opinion and its holdings
and discusses Stevens’ dissent. This article relies on Justice Stevens’
discussion in the dissent because the majority did not address the definition of
life used in the Missouri state law. A plurality decided the case on other matters,
but Justice Stevens, in his dissent, directly addressed the legality of the
Missouri definition of life. Id. Given the similarity between the Missouri
definition of life, and the definition at issue with the South Dakota statute (a
Christian definition of life), it seems prudent to examine Justice Stevens’
comments. Justice Stevens is also the only Justice to comment on this similar
definition.
111
Id. at 490. Webster is an interesting case that, although not directly
about the Establishment Clause, has important implications for Establishment
Clause case law, and potentially for contraceptive use. At issue in Webster is a
Missouri state law that amended the current state abortion laws. Id. at 499–500.
The preamble to the state law defined life as beginning at conception (however,
the state legislature inadvertently used the wrong term and actually meant
“fertilization”), and stated that “unborn children” had explicit rights for health,
life, and well-being. Id. at 501. The law went so far as to guarantee full
Constitutional rights to all “unborn children.” Id. The law also required
viability tests for any fetus believed to be at least 20 weeks in gestational age
and prevented public employees and facilities from being used for any abortion
except to save the life of the mother. Id. In addition, the law prohibited the use
of public funding to advise or counsel a woman to have an abortion unless
necessary to save her life. Id. Lower courts overturned the law as
unconstitutional and held the definition of life in the preamble is an
unconstitutional attempt to define life as a means to support the state’s new
abortion laws. Id. at 503.
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Court’s only discussion of whether the Missouri legislature’s
preamble was constitutional—illustrates the pitfalls of such a
definition and is therefore informative for the discussion at hand.112
Moreover, Justice Stevens’ comments demonstrate awareness of
prior precedent and the potential ramifications of the definition
used in the Missouri preamble.113
Justice Stevens’ also asserted that the legislature improperly
defined “conception.”114 Like the South Dakota statute, the
Missouri statute linked conception with fertilization, despite the
medical definition associating conception with implantation.115
Upon determining that the statute was enacted solely for religious
purposes, Stevens concluded that no “secular basis for
The Supreme Court examined four portions of the Missouri law: (1) the
preamble, (2) the ban on the use of public employees and facilities for non-life
saving abortions, (3) the ban on public funding for non-life saving abortion
counseling, and (4) the forced viability tests for all fetuses believed to be 20
weeks in gestational age. Id. at 504. The majority refused to rule on the
Constitutionality of the preamble on the grounds that the preamble merely
expressed a value judgment made by the state for protecting life over abortion,
and had no actual bearing upon the practice of abortion. Accordingly, the time
was not “correct” to rule either way regarding the preamble, and the preamble is
to be understood as stating a preference and is non-binding. Id. at 505–07.
112
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 563–72.
115
See MILLER & BRACKMAN KEANE , supra note 19 and accompanying
text. Webster, 492 U.S. at 563. Missouri’s use of fertilization as the beginning
of life is relevant to the discussion of state conscientious objector laws because
South Dakota’s definition of “unborn child,” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-12(50A) (2006), implicitly uses the same definition of life beginning at
fertilization. Accordingly, Justice Stevens’ assessment of the Missouri statute at
issue in Webster would thus also apply to South Dakota’s conscientious
objection statute and its definition of an “unborn child.” It is important to
realize that Justice Stevens’ words, although written in a dissenting opinion, are
part of a dissent because he took the Missouri statute on its face and actually
engaged in the evaluation of the preamble that the rest of the Court refused to do
at the time of Webster. Accordingly, the Court has not ruled against Stevens’
interpretation of the preamble; it merely decided not to rule at the time of
Webster, which renders Stevens the only member of the Supreme Court to
directly address the constitutionality of the Missouri preamble.
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differentiating between contraceptive procedures that are effective
immediately before and those that are effective immediately after
fertilization” exists. 116 Hence, Stevens found that the law failed the
first prong of the Lemon test and deemed it unconstitutional. In
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause, Stevens made it
clear that this violation resulted not from the overlap of a legal and
religious definition, but rather from the lack of a secular purpose to
justify the state’s use of one religion’s definition of life.117
Based on Steven’s assessment of the Missouri preamble, the
South Dakota statute also has no secular purpose for allowing
pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions based on a
Christian definition of life.118 Since Stevens concluded that there
could be no secular purpose that would justify protecting a
fertilized egg as opposed to an implanted fertilized egg—
distinctions which adhere to the Christian, rather than secular,
medical definition—in the Missouri statute, there must be no
secular purpose for the similarly worded South Dakota statute.119
116

Webster, 492 U.S. at 566.
Id.
118
Recall that the South Dakota statute does not permit refusals for
personal, religious, or moral reasons, but rather limits the statutorily
permissible reasons to fill a prescription, including one for birth control, because
it will result in the death of an “unborn child,” the definition of which is one
directly in line with mainstream Christian theology. Therefore, the state has
codified a religious definition of life without a valid secular purpose.
119
The South Dakota statutory definition of “unborn child” is: “an
individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live
birth,” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A)(2006). For purposes of comparison,
Missouri’s preamble states, in part, “(1) The life of each human being begins at
conception; … As used in this section, the term ‘unborn children’ or ‘unborn
child’ shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings
from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological
development.” MO. REV . STAT . §§ 1.205.1(1)–1.205.3 (2006). As can be seen,
both the South Dakota and Missouri definitions employ remarkably similar
language. One noticeable difference is that South Dakota uses “fertilization”
whereas Missouri uses “conception.” However, the Missouri statute defines
“conception” as “the fertilization of the ovum of a female by a sperm of a male,”
MO . REV . STAT . § 188.015(3) (2006). As Justice Stevens points out, the
Missouri statute improperly uses the medical term “conception,” which
typically means implantation of a fertilized ovum, where what the Missouri
117
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Without a valid secular purpose, the South Dakota law cannot pass
the first prong of the Lemon test.120
2.

The Second Prong of the Lemon Test

Although failing to satisfy even one prong of the test renders
the law unconstitutional, an evaluation of each prong is valuable.
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the statute’s
“principal or primary effect . . . be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . . .”121 That is, the law must be neutral with
regards to religion and neither help nor harm one particular
religion.122
Establishment Clause case law has elaborated on the meaning of
“advances” or “inhibits.” In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court found
that one necessary inquiry for determining whether government
“advances” or “inhibits” religion is “whether the government
intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion.”123 An extension of this definition includes direct
monetary benefit, or harm, to a particular religion.124 Indeed, as the
statute defines is the medical definition of fertilization, the term used in the
South Dakota statute. Webster, 492 U.S. at 563 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, South Dakota and Missouri use statutes that are almost identical
in language.
While Stevens’ dissent is not controlling, his opinion is the only one
rendered by the Court with regard to the issue of statutory definition of life that
is clearly favoring Christianity over all other religions. In that Stevens’ dissent
is consistent with current Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedent, the
specifics of his argument should be adopted by the Court as their official
position with respect to religious definitions of life that do not, and cannot, have
a secular purpose.
120
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
121
Id. at 613.
122
Id.
123
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
124
See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989)
(holding that “when confined exclusively to publications advancing the tenets of
a religious faith,” an exemption from sales tax violates the Establishment
Clause, which prohibits the government from directly subsidizing religious
messages while excluding secular publications from the same subsidy); Lemon,
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Court stated in Zorach v. Clauson, “[g]overnment may not finance
religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend
secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force
one or some religion on any person.”125 Last, Engel v. Vitale held
that although religious coercion would fit this definition,
government action need not be coercive to provide a harm or
benefit. 126
In light of this case law, it is clear that the South Dakota statute
implicitly benefits and advances Christianity by legally applying a
Christian conception of life, thereby giving the arm of government
to pharmacists who may force submission to their beliefs by
refusing to fill one’s birth control prescription. 127 By using a
403 U.S. at 606–07 (invalidating state salary subsidies to teachers of secular
subjects at church-related educational institutions); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948) (holding that privately employed
religious teachers who teach religion in public schools during school hours
violates the Establishment Clause, in part, because the religions are benefiting
from the expenditure of state money).
125
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (emphasis added).
126
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
127
By allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions in
accordance with a legal definition that is consistent with one religion, but does
not have a valid secular purpose, the state is acting in such a way as to lend
support for one religion. Even if the state did not intend to support Christianity
with its definition of life, this fact does not negate the reality that those who are
Christian pharmacists now have the “right” to refuse to give people medication
for which they have prescriptions; whereas non-Christians with other religious
beliefs regarding life have no equivalent right to impose their beliefs on others.
This scenario results in dissimilar treatment of various religions. To point out
the unequal treatment of religions is not to say other religions deserve the same
rights, but rather illustrates that the South Dakota government is not treating
religions equally, and is in effect supporting one religion (Christianity) over all
others. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947) (stating that “[t]he ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another.”) (emphasis added); see also Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating that the “[g]overnment may not
finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on
any person” (emphasis added)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433 (1962)
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Christian definition of life, South Dakota allows pharmacists to use
the Christian definition to refuse services, namely filling birth
control prescriptions, to customers. By using the legislative
process to promote the Christian definition,128 and to protect
pharmacists’ ability to enforce their beliefs onto others, the state is
directly supporting the Christian faith through advocacy and
support for a theological belief. Therefore, the South Dakota
statute unconstitutionally privileges one religion and fails the
second prong of the Lemon test.129

(equating the codification of religious principles to the religious persecution the
Framers specifically tried to avoid when drafting the Constitution, Bill of
Rights, and the law under both of these documents); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 51–55 (1985) (articulating the Court’s position that in order to
preserve the right to free expression and freedom of conscience, the state cannot
endeavor to enforce any religion’s beliefs by means of state power, as to do so
robs all of their liberties, complicates politics, and sullies religious beliefs).
This forced compliance might not be as prevalent in a large city where women
have numerous pharmacies in a reasonably close proximity, but these options
are not always available. Indeed, within the context of one-pharmacy and onepharmacist towns, the refusal to fill a woman’s prescription for birth control is
tantamount to enforcing this subtle theocracy unless the woman has the ability
to travel to the next pharmacy that will fill her prescription. See Karissa Eide,
Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions on Moral or
Religious Grounds, 42 CAL. W. L. REV . 121, 121–22 (2005); Holly Teliska,
Obstacles to Access: How Pharmacist Refusal Clauses Undermine the Basic
Health Care Needs of Rural and Low-Income Women, 20 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 229, 231 (2005); Collins, supra note 96, at 37.
128
See Collins, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
129
While the first prong of the Lemon test does not clearly apply to the
states, other than South Dakota, that have conscientious objector statutes which
clearly apply to pharmacists and birth control, the second prong is more
applicable. Part of an analysis under the second prong of the Lemon test involves
discussion of Zorach, 343 U.S. 306. Under Zorach, if a state institution, such
as the legislature, tries to “use secular institutions to force one or some religion
on any person,” then the act, in this case a law, is unconstitutional. Id. at 314.
By allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions based on
religious reasons, Arkansas, ARK. CODE . A NN. § 20-16-304 (2006), Florida,
FLA . STAT . § 381.0051 (2006), Washington, W ASH. R EV. CODE ANN . §
48.43.065 (2006), and Wyoming, W YO . STAT . A NN. § 42-5-101 (2006),
permit the state to bolster specific religious beliefs against and to the detriment
of those persons who do not hold the same beliefs.
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T HE T HIRD PRONG OF THE LEMON T EST

The third prong of the Lemon test requires that “the statute . . .
not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”130
The Lemon Court explained that courts must “examine the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and the religious
authority.”131 Based on the explanation given in Lemon, an
excessive government entanglement with religion arises when the
state is actively involved in promoting a religious message, or when
the state fails to distance itself from a religious message. For a
“government entanglement with religion . . . [to be] excessive,” the
state must take actions that are proactive in nature, such as lending
the arm of the state in a manner that shows a relationship of
support between the state and the religious message.132
The problem is exacerbated by the governmental regulation of prescription
medications such as birth control and the illegality of obtaining prescription
drugs from a non-pharmacist. Therefore, when states such as Arkansas, Florida,
Washington, and Wyoming allow pharmacists to refuse to fill birth control
prescriptions, and these states neither allow legal recourse against these
pharmacists nor provide a clear alternative for obtaining the medication (other
than hoping to find a pharmacist that will fill the prescription), the state has
used state power to directly advance religion at the cost of others. Therefore,
Arkansas, Florida, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming all have
conscientious objection statutes that fail the second prong of the Lemon test and
are thus unconstitutional. Whether Mississippi’s statute is constitutional is less
clear because Mississippi does not explicitly identify religion as the grounds for
why a pharmacist may refuse to fill birth control prescriptions. See MISS. CODE
ANN . § 41 107-5 (2006). However, the statute lists one’s “conscience” as a
reason for refusing to fill prescriptions. Id. One’s conscience may include one’s
religious beliefs. Therefore, it is likely, but unclear, whether Mississippi’s
statute would be unconstitutional under the second prong of the Lemon test.
130
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
131
Id. at 615.
132
Id. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–19 (upholding the New Jersey
law because the state bussed all students and did nothing to lend state power or
support to the religious message of the Catholic schools that also had their
students’ families reimbursed for bussing) with Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (holding that a Texas law that exempted religious
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First, the “character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited” by the South Dakota law are, at first glance, ambiguous.
Clearly, pharmacists who refuse to fill birth control prescriptions
benefit. Although pharmacists are not necessarily a religious
institution, their actions work to benefit Christianity. More
specifically, the pharmacists who take advantage of the law are
presumably Christian.133 The conscientious objection law benefits
the religion by providing pharmacists a legislatively supported
mechanism for enforcing their religious beliefs onto others. Second,
the law directly and specifically benefits Christianity by adopting
its views on the beginning of life. By forgoing use of the medical
definition of when a pregnancy begins in favor of one that is
consistent with Christian theological beliefs, the state is lending its
power and support to determine that the Christian definition (and
not the medical, Islamic, Jewish, or other secular construction) is
“correct.”
The “nature of the aid that the State provides” through the
statute is also supportive of Christianity. Foremost, the statute
offers legal protection to those pharmacists who refuse to fill a
prescription based on their Christian beliefs.134 The state also
publications from state sales tax functioned as the government’s showing
preferential treatment for religion, as opposed to secular publications, and thus
the regulation involved active state support for a religious message).
133
See Collins, supra note 96 at 44–46; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE ,
ABORTION: T HE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 145–46 (1990); see also Donald Herbe,
The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a Pharmacist’s Right to
Refuse Facilitation of Abortion and Emergency Contraception, 17 J.L. &
HEALTH 77, 85–88 (2003); Marilyn Gardner, Pharmacists’ Moral Beliefs vs.
Women’s Legal Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI . MONITOR, Apr. 26, 2004, at 11;
Dennis Rambaud, Prescription Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to
Refuse: Examining the Efficacy of Conscience Law, 4 C ARDOZO PUB. L. P OL ’ Y
& ETHICS J. 195, 195–97 (2006); Teliska, supra note 7, at 235; Eide, supra
note 7; Sarah Sturmon Dale, Can a Pharmacist Refuse to Dispense Birth
Control?, T IME , June 7, 2004, at 22.
134
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006). Arkansas, Florida,
Mississippi, Washington, and Wyoming all also offer protection from criminal
and civil liability for any pharmacist who refuses to fill a birth control
prescription; therefore, every statute in this relevant grouping has the same
potential problem with respect to the third prong of the Lemon test. ARK.
CODE . ANN . § 20-16-304 (2006); FLA. STAT . § 381.0051 (2006); MISS. CODE
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offers aid by endorsing the Christian view of life. As such, the law
seems to lend significant state aid to the promotion of a Christian,
as opposed to a secular, viewpoint and the furthering of a Christian
message.
Although case law also directs courts to consider any “resulting
relationship between the government and the religious authority,”
the South Dakota statute does not explicitly create a relationship
between the state government and Christianity. 135 Nevertheless,
the absence of such a relationship does not render the South
Dakota statute constitutional.136 South Dakota does not require a
religious authority to enforce its codified definition of life, nor is it
necessary for the state to discuss the conscientious objection law
with religious leaders.137 It is not necessary for the state to
maintain a relationship with a religious institution.138 Hence, while
there does not appear to be an explicit relationship, such a
relationship is not necessary to conclude the law violates the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.139
Finally, in attempting to piece together the excessive
entanglement test, courts must examine whether the state is
actively involved in spreading a religious message or if the state
failed to distance itself from such a message.140 First, by codifying
a Christian definition of life and protecting pharmacists who refuse
to fill prescriptions for religious reasons, South Dakota is actively
working to spread a Christian message regarding in particular what
defines life as well as what are “acceptable” sexual behaviors and
choices. By codifying the Christian definition of life, and then
using state power to protect those who refuse to fill medications
ANN . § 41-107-5 (2006); W ASH . REV . CODE § 48.43.065 (2006); W YO . STAT .
ANN . § 42-5-101 (2006).
135
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
136
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
137
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290.
138
Id.
139
See Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Tex. Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. 1; Lee, 505
U.S. 577; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. 290.
140
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
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because of this definition, the government is actively promoting the
tenets of Christianity. 141 Accordingly, South Dakota has not
distanced itself from the religious messages used by pharmacists,
and the statute impermissibly entangles religion and government.
Therefore, South Dakota’s conscientious objection law fails the
third prong of the Lemon test and violates the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.
IV. BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN WITH THE STATE’S
INTEREST IN PROTECTING P HARMACISTS’ RIGHTS
Supporters of conscientious objection laws contend that
pharmacists should have the right to decline to fill birth control
prescriptions believed to violate the pharmacists’ religious
beliefs.142 Nevertheless, the pharmacists’ right to object is in direct
conflict with women’s constitutional right to privacy, including
access to birth control.143
Even though a statute need not completely prohibit the use or
sale of contraceptives to constitute an unlawful infringement on a
person’s right to privacy, 144 states should work to strike the
proper balance between the rights of women and pharmacists. In
trying to strike such a balance where two parties’ rights are in
conflict, states should minimize the interference with each of the
conflicting parties’ rights as much as possible.
Conscientious objection statutes impose a significant burden on
a woman’s right to obtain birth control and emergency

141

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Cara Soloman, Druggists Want the Right to Say No to Certain
Medications, Seattle Times, Mar. 11, 2006, at B1.
143
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1998) (reaffirming
the right); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (affirming the
right and extending it to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1967)
(extending the right to non-married couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 348
U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right to privacy and stating that it protected
the right of married couples to obtain birth control).
144
See Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (holding that a statute forbidding the
distribution of contraceptives to persons over 16 except by licensed pharmacists
was unconstitutional because it would unduly limit access to contraceptives).
142
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contraceptives. Once a woman, in consultation with her physician,
has determined that she wishes to use prescription contraceptives,
she has the legal right to have that prescription filled at a
pharmacy. For women who live in large metropolitan areas, where
there are often multiple pharmacies located within minutes of each
other and which employ multiple pharmacists, conscientious
objection laws may not have as serious an effect on this right. In
many cases, there may be another pharmacist at the pharmacy that
can fill her prescription, or she may be able to travel to another
close located pharmacy. On the other hand, even women who live
in large metropolitan areas are not immune. An urban woman may
not have access to other pharmacies because her insurance plan
limits her to certain establishments.145 Further, low-income women
may endure substantial economic burdens if required to travel
extensively to obtain their prescriptions from other pharmacies.
The problem is much more serious for the many women who
live in small towns and rural areas. Only 12 percent of pharmacists
nationwide practice in rural areas,146 and rural areas have fewer
pharmacists proportionally than urban areas.147 Also, fewer
pharmacists choose to practice in rural areas.148 Given the limited
number of pharmacies and pharmacists in rural areas, even a single
objector may have serious consequences for women.149 Women
may be forced to travel miles to find a pharmacist who would be
willing to serve them. This problem is exacerbated in the context of
145

Many insurance plans, for instance, provide greater coverage if you go to
an “in-network” pharmacy. See, e.g. Military.com, Benefits, http://www.
military.com/benefits/tricare/tricare-pharmacy/tricare-pharmacy-program
(last
visited Sept. 14, 2007) (highlighting the difference in purchasing prescriptions at
in-network and non-network pharmacies and explaining that costs will not be
covered to the same extent at non-network pharmacies). Many managed care
insurance programs distinguish in-network and out-of-network pharmacies.
146
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RURAL HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, T HE 2006 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY: RURAL HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICE ISSUES (2006), available at http://ruralcommittee.hrsa.gov/
NAC06AReport.htm#Executive%20Summary.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
For a greater discussion of the obstacles faced by rural women, see
Teliska, supra note 7.
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emergency contraception, which must be taken within seventy-two
hours of intercourse and requires a prescription in most states.150
Overall, the consequences are serious. One possible effect is
unwanted pregnancies, and consequently, children being born to
parents who have neither the emotional nor financial means to
support them. In some cases, pharmacists may not only refuse to
fill the prescription, but may very vocally refuse and lecture the
woman, resulting in her humiliation and a breach of the
confidentiality to which she is entitled should other customers be
within earshot. 151 In other instances, the prescriptions are for
medical reasons unrelated to birth control, and the woman’s
inability to obtain her prescription may lead to a worsening of the
medical condition for which she received the prescription.
Although the negative consequences of these statutes are grave,
there is also an important interest in protecting a pharmacist’s right
to follow his conscience and practice his profession in a way that
does not conflict with his religious beliefs. 152 Advocates of a
pharmacist’s right of refusal argue that the state has an interest in
protecting the pharmacist’s first amendment right to the free

150

Jed Miller, The Unconscionability of Conscience Clauses: Pharmacists
Consciences and Women’s Access to Contraception, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 237,
246–47 (2006).
151
Article VII of the Code of Ethics of the American Society of Consultant
Pharmacists provides as follows: “The Consultant Pharmacist shall respect the
confidentiality of all clinical records, professional notes, memoranda, reports and
other records relating to any patient’s medical condition or medication therapy;
and shall in no case disclose such information without proper legal
authorization.” American Society of Consultant Pharmacists Code of Ethics,
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/amer.soc.consultant.pharmacists.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2007). Similarly, this behavior would breach two separate articles
within the Code of Ethics of the American Pharmacists’ Association: Article II
provides that “a pharmacist promotes the good of every patient in a caring,
compassionate, and confidential manner,” while Article III states that “A
pharmacist respects the autonomy and dignity of each patient.”
Pharmacists.com, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, http://www.pharmacist.
com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search1&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=2903 (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
152
Rob Stein, Pharmcists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, W ASH . POST,
Mar. 28, 2005, at A1.
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exercise of religion,153 including the refusal to engage in practices
that would violate his fundamental religious beliefs.
In Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court stated that:
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost,
the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment
obviously excludes all “governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such.” The government may not
compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false,
impose special disabilities on the basis of religious
views or religious status, or lend its power to one or the
other side in controversies over religious authority or
dogma.154
Consequently, supporters of conscientous objection laws contend
the First Amendment demands pharmacists be able to decline to fill
a prescription because to do otherwise would conflict with their
religious belief that the prevention of conception is akin to taking a
life.155
Despite any concern for pharmacists’ right to object, the
constitutional right to privacy and potential obstacles to obtaining
birth control outweigh pharmacists’ interest in exercising their
religion. As a result, reform must be generated that protects
pharmacists’ rights only to the extent that it does not pose such
impossible obstacles to access for women. The consequences faced
by pharmacists in the absence of such extreme statutes as that of
South Dakota may be easier accommodated and, indeed, may even
be foreseeable. Such legislative reform would serve as a political
compromise and would be consistent with “the position

153

U.S. C ONST . amend. I (“Congress shall make no law … prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] ….”).
154
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110
S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
155
The Associated Press, Board Questions Pharmacists’ Refusal to
Disperse Birth-Control Pills, Oct. 13, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org//news.aspx?id=14189.
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incorporated in the Conscience Clause of the American Pharmacists
Association’s Code of Ethics, which recognizes a pharmacist’s
right to exercise conscientious refusal but the simultaneous need to
ensure patient access to prescribed drugs.”156 Thus, in becoming a
pharmacist, one should perhaps be prepared to ensure patients’
access to medications, even if it conflicts with one’s beliefs.
No court has yet determined that following one’s conscience
constitutes a compelling state interest. Rather, in Valley Hospital
Association v. Mat Su Coalition for Choice,157 the Alaska State
Supreme Court found that the “right of conscience” of individuals
and institutions was not a compelling state interest under the
Alaska constitution, and therefore did not supersede the rights of
women to obtain a constitutionally protected abortion.158
Other courts have explained that the right to practice one’s
religious beliefs is not an absolute privilege.159 For example, courts
have held that an employer is not obligated to accommodate the
religion of an employee if the accommodation requires more than a
de minimus burden on the employer.160 One example of a possible
accommodation for pharmacists in absence of broad statutory
protection of their objection rights would be to allow pharmacists
to refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control or emergency
contraception only when another pharmacist is on duty at the same
pharmacy that will fill the prescription. This accommodation
would seem to provide a means for a pharmacist to practice his
profession in conformity with his religious beliefs while not

156

Id.
948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
158
Id. at 971.
159
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977);
Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1982). This lack
of an absolute right can also be inferred from the EEOC Guidelines, which, in
explaining dealing with the problem of an employee who refuses to work during
an employer’s normal workweek due to his religion, states that an employer has
an obligation under the statute to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of
employees where such accommodation can be made without serious
inconvenience to the conduct of the business. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967).
160
Id.
157
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infringing on the privacy rights of women.161 While such a statute
may limit the total number of pharmacies at which a pharmacist
would be able to seek employment, this consequence is not so
harsh in light of the fact that many religions have practices that
limit their practitioners’ employment prospects 162 Even in the
absence of a protected right, pharmacists would still be allowed to
voice their disapproval, seek jobs that do not require them to go
against their religious beliefs, or to work at pharmacies that can
accommodate their religious beliefs.163
Furthermore, the Court ruled in Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock,164 that a burden on a religion is not necessarily
unconstitutional because a “state may justify a limitation on
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest.”165 Logically, one overriding
governmental interest would be the ability of women to obtain
medication they have been prescribed by their doctors. This
governmental interest is especially applicable to birth control
medication because such medication is prescribed for various
medical conditions and does not only function as a contraceptive.
The appropriate solution may depend on the context.
Conscientious objection statutes must be either struck down as
unconstitutional or at least reformed to accommodate a woman’s
161

Of course, the preservation of the pharmacists’ rights are dependent upon
his being able to find a pharmacy to work where he will be able to practice with
another pharmacist who has no objection to filling all prescriptions.
162
For example, if a person’s religion requires him to attend church
services on Sunday, his employment prospects would be limited to employers
that did not require him to work regularly at the time of his worship services.
Alternatively, if one’s religion requires the wearing of certain items of clothing,
there may be some jobs where the wearing of such religious garb would prevent
employment, as in the case of Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1988), in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the Air Force did not violate the religious
freedom of a Jewish officer when a regulation prohibited him from wearing a
yarmulke while in uniform. The court recognized a compelling need for
uniformity in the military with the subordination of personal identities to the
overall group mission.
163
Eide, supra, note 7, at 145.
164
489 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
165
Id., citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1982).
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rights to birth control. Appropriate reform requires a proper
balance be struck: conscientious objection laws must be narrowly
drawn so that women retain access to birth control medication, yet
pharmacists should not necessarily be required to violate their own
religion. Such reform requires many pharmacies to adopt policies
which can accommodate their employers’ beliefs while still
providing essential services to women who need birth control and
emergency contraception. Whatever the compromise, limitations
must be made. In the meantime, pharmacists must proceed to fill
these necessary prescriptions for women.
CONCLUSION
The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates the number of women
using birth control pills in the United States at 11.6 million.166 The
figure only includes birth control pills, however, and does not
account for birth control injections, patches, diaphragms, or other
control methods requiring a prescription from a doctor. Thus, a
significant number of women are likely to be adversely affected if
these conscientious objection laws are upheld without limitation.
Indeed, many of these statutes, certainly that of South Dakota, not
only interfere with a woman’s constitutionally protected right to
birth control, but also clearly violate the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution. Until legislatures strike a proper balance in
protecting pharmacists’ rights and women’s rights, these laws must
not be upheld and pharmacists must be required to fulfill their
professional responsibilities.

166

See Guttmacher Institute, Contraceptive Use, http://www.
guttmacher.org./pubs/fb_contr_use.html (last visited June 17, 2006).

